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New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA
Although there have been several reviews of the The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive
Sciences, the six reviews in this issue of Artificial Intelligence represent an unusual
opportunity to see in one collection how scholars from a wide range of perspectives
evaluate MITECS. I found it very useful to consider the reviews side by side and am
grateful to the reviewers for providing a number of new insights into the nature of the
cognitive sciences. It is also gratifying to see such generally positive assessments from
five of the six reviewers (Carr, Dorr, Husbands, Okamato and Peterson) and it is intriguing
to consider the more negative comments by Lakoff. In this essay, rather than consider in
detail the many points raised by the reviews, I examine more globally how a project like
MITECS might be evaluated and how it seemed to fare in light of these reviews.
There are four primary ways in which an attempt to provide a comprehensive portrait of
the cognitive sciences might be evaluated:
(1) Does it give a correct picture of the phenomena of interest to cognitive scientists?
(2) Even if it covers the right phenomena does it also cover the most important
approaches to those phenomena?
(3) Even if covers the right phenomena and the right approaches does it do so in a way
that clearly accurately represents the relevant literatures?
(4) Even if each of the articles succeeds on all accounts individually, do they as a
collection link together in ways that give readers a sense of the cognitive sciences
overall?
The six reviews of MITECS touch on each of these four kinds of potential problems;
but clearly with different emphases. Moreover, in at least some cases, it is not clear
which of these criticisms is really intended. Rob Wilson’s comment provides a very useful
description of how MITECS emerged as a project and how that process might be expected
to relate to some of the concerns raised by reviewers. It shows how the evolution of
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MITECS was not driven by some agenda that we had in mind to promote a particular
part line of Cognitive Science and exclude others. Instead, our goal was to get the best
sense we could of what the cognitive sciences are, a little bit of where they are going, and
of the extent to which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. We also wanted to
provide a way for those who want to learn to get a sense of what some area of the Cognitive
Sciences is about and, for the more ambitious, what the enterprise as a whole looks like.
Our methods of selecting associate editors and contributors were all designed to get a truly
non-partisan sense of the cognitive sciences. Given the nature of the various fields that
make up the cognitive sciences and the sometimes passionate disagreements that occur
within some of those fields, I agree with Rob that we covered most of the major themes
and did so without some single overriding bias. That said, there are more subtle ways in
which we might have missed the mark that concern each of the four points listed above.
Let me turn to each of those:
Does MITECS give a correct picture of the phenomena that are of interest to
cognitive scientists?
Not all areas of academic inquiry agree on correct entities of study or even on the
existence of roughly the same set of entities. Many in the humanities disagree violently
on whether a field such as literary theory is really about intentions of authors, Marxist
economic principles, or oppression. In the natural sciences, it is much less common
to see such debates. Physicists and biologists do not tend to disagree so much about
the metaphysical reality of what they study. Where do the Cognitive Sciences sit in
this respect? Several of the Cognitive Sciences seem to have little disagreement. The
neurosciences and most of psychology agree on the phenomena of interest, as do most
of the philosophers. We found strikingly little discord here on what should be included.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we also found pretty good consensus with culture, cognition
and evolution despite what appears to be much more potential for polemic in the area. Our
reviewers also seem to agree that the articles in those areas were on target, especially Carr,
Okamato, and Dorr. With respect to computational intelligence, there is a concern raised by
both Peterson and Husbands that the computational approach has been overemphasized at
the expense of other approaches to artificial minds, such as those that look at entire active
systems in context. Here, I am less clear on whether the real concern is about a neglect
of the right phenomena or about whether the wrong approaches are being taken to right
phenomena. It is clear, as argued by Rob Wilson, that an enormous range of senses of
computation are part of MITECS, including ones that do not at all endorse symbolic forms
of computation. What phenomena are missing? Does looking at intelligent devices in the
context of actions in real world settings bring into relief phenomena that are otherwise
obscure? Possibly. That is, indeed, the promise of such an alternative. As of yet, however,
I cannot see any clear consensus on what those phenomena are.
Finally, we turn to linguistics. Here, as noted, we had some of the most vigorous debates
among contributors and with us as the editors. But it is my sense that the debates were
not usually about the phenomena. People tended to agree that there are universal patterns
of language structure that need explanation, an explanation that will include a formal
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description of those structural properties. They also tended to agree on the importance
of linking those formal descriptions to language acquisition and learnability issues more
broadly. I do think we all owe a great deal to Chomsky for enabling us to see more
clearly these phenomena and why they are of interest. There is more agreement on these
phenomena than there was 40 years ago, and that agreement represents a major advance.
One might interpret Lakoff’s remarks about the wrong paradigm as partly about studying
the wrong phenomena, but it is hard to see a real case being made along those lines. It
is a well known argument in the philosophy of science that new paradigms can highlight
new methods and new phenomena in ways that mutually enhance the other; but in the case
of cognitive linguistics, it is not clear what phenomena it embraces that other forms of
linguistics and cognitive science do not. Metaphor, for example, while a very popular topic
in some cognitive linguistics circles, has certainly been a phenomenon of interest to many
others as well.
Does MITECS cover the right approaches to various phenomena?
Here, there is certainly more potential for disagreement. After all, even in the hardest of
the “hard sciences”, such as particle physics, there are major disagreements about methods.
Our goal was not to showcase any one method but to give a feel for the range of substantive
approaches that were perceived by most practitioners as making real advances. In some
areas, there seems to be little disagreement about the range of approaches described.
In neuroscience, the contrasting approaches are pretty well understood by everyone. In
psychology, there may be more debate about how even to describe some approaches (such
as the links between dynamical system theories and connectionist theories), but the terrain
of the field is apparent to most of its practitioners. In the case of cultural psychology,
the reverse case seems to be true. Scholars agree to a large extent on many of the most
interesting phenomena, but are still struggling to find a consensus on what are the most
promising approaches. MITECS doesn’t fail to cover a key approach in this area as much as
it illustrates some of the struggles still going on in attempts to find more fruitful approaches.
In the area of artificial intelligence, there may have been a neglect of “non-computational”
approaches to intelligence, i.e. those that reject the computational perspective. My own
sense here is that these alternative approaches still have the flavor of showing fascinating
“demos” rather than articulating clearly in positive terms what the those approaches do
have at their theoretical core; but I take to heart the reviewers’ observations and would
certainly want to explore this approach in a second edition and ask potential contributors
to try to lay out in specific terms the distinctive properties of those alternative approaches
and the constituencies that support them. Although I do not really grasp what criteria
make various artificial “systems-in-action” truly non-computational as opposed to simply
another computational approach within an already highly diverse set, I am open to that
possibility and look forward to learning more about it.
Linguistics is a different case altogether. There are dramatic differences of opinion on
how best to study the nature of language and our entries reflect many major controversies in
the field. Certainly many of our contributors would be astonished and/or greatly amused to
be seen as part of the “formalist nativist” paradigm, as Lakoff suggests they are. As noted
220 F.C. Keil / Artificial Intelligence 130 (2001) 217–221
by Rob Wilson, we were constantly struck by how much more often the linguistics entries
resulted in animated reviews and disagreements. Such disagreements may well be sign of
a healthy evolutionary process in a relatively new field, but they hardly point towards one
dominant view. But perhaps the embodied approach or “paradigm” that Lakoff offers was
slighted. How could we tell? Presumably because the approach has had a major influence
on many in the field. In that case, even if they disagree, scholars should be citing this
alternative as a worthy adversary. We did not see such a pattern in the literature. Nor did
we see clear successful “demos” of the sort that we do see in AI that make me inclined
to wonder about whether another approach is needed to explain those successful results. I
respect greatly many of the papers that Lakoff cites but I do not see them neatly coalescing
into an alternative approach.
Does MITECS cover approaches or phenomena accurately and clearly?
Here I am pleased there is a consensus among all reviewers that MITECS does a
very good job of having clear readable entries that accurately and faithfully describe
the relevant literatures. As editors we find this particularly gratifying since we devoted
enormous energies to those goals, on several occasions writing reviews as long as the
entries themselves. Our contributors were almost all wonderfully responsive to our reviews
and to those of “insider” experts and “outsider” members from other cognitive science
areas. If nothing else, readers of MITECS are able to get unusually clear, accurate, concise
interpretations of most of the major literatures in the cognitive sciences.
Does MITECS give an appropriate sense of how the whole of the Cognitive Sciences
is greater than the sum of its parts?
Even if MITECS were perfect on the first three dimensions I have discussed, it might fail
to adequately capture how the cognitive sciences intersect to create a truly interdisciplinary
program of research and scholarship. Our reviewers wondered the same thing, but were
cautious in attributing the lack of connections to failings in MITECS or to failings in the
Cognitive Sciences. I think a bit of both is at work. There is no doubt that more connections
will emerge in the future and so the field itself is surely incomplete. It is clear from the
entries in MITECS that many phenomena (e.g., pattern recognition, coordinated action,
learning, communication, numerical computation, tracking of individuals) are relevant
to all of the cognitive sciences and that scholars need to be converging more in their
discussions. But it is also true, that as editors we are sure to have missed some connections
or to have not prodded contributors enough to talk more about possible links. There
was plenty of such prodding and some extremely helpful responses; but in other cases,
contributors felt that they had done enough to describe their own cherished area in such
unforgivingly tight amounts of space. It is one of the hopes of the MITECS project that,
by having all of these entries so concisely in one volume and by containing at least some
of the links, MITECS itself can be a force towards more meaningful cross disciplinary
advances. That said, there is also the danger of succumbing to a cognitive science version
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of meaning holism, or the frame problem, in which everything ultimately connects to
everything else. We quite deliberately excluded showing links that were technically correct
but didn’t seem to be truly meaningful. A major challenge for the future is to determine the
truly important and significant links that constitute the real highways of interaction in the
cognitive sciences.
Overall, given the four ways that I have set up for evaluating MITECS, the reviews seem
to be most critical about whether we have covered a fully representative set of approaches.
Even here there is not a clear consensus among the reviewers, but perhaps there is an
emerging theme that “non-computational” AI merits closer attention. With respect to the
fourth issue of cross disciplinary coverage, while there were only modest criticisms, it may
be here that the most work needs to be done both by the field and in the next edition of
MITECS.
